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Ukraine: The Price of Internal Division
Posted on March 1, 2014 by Jack
With all of the reports coming out of
Ukraine, Moscow, Washington, and
European capitals, the mutual
accusations, the knee-jerk speculation,
and—not least—the hysterical language
of some observers, bordering on the
apocalyptic, it is difficult to keep in
mind the long-term implications of what
is happening. Nevertheless, I believe that
nobody can understand the likely
outcomes of what is happening unless
they bear in mind the historical,
geographic, political and psychological
factors at play in these dramatic events.
The view of most of the media, whether
Russian or Western, seems to be that one
side or the other is going to “win” or
“lose” Ukraine.
I believe that is fundamentally mistaken.
If I were Ukrainian I would echo the
immortal words of the late Walt Kelly’s
Pogo: “We have met the enemy and he is
us.” The fact is, Ukraine is a state but not
yet a nation. In the 22-plus years of its
independence, it has not yet found a
leader who can unite its citizens in a
shared concept of Ukrainian identity.
Yes, Russia has interfered, but it is not
Russian interference that has created
Ukrainian disunity but rather the
haphazard way the country was
assembled from parts that were not
always mutually compatible. To the flaw
at the inception of an independent
Ukraine, one must add the baleful effects
of the Soviet Communist heritage both
Russia and Ukraine have inherited.
A second mistake people make is to
assume that when a given government
adopts a particular policy that policy is
in the true interest of that country. In
fact, as often as not, policies made in the
heat of emotion, by leaders who feel
personally challenged by opponents, are
more likely to be counterproductive than
supportive of a country’s true interest.
Political leaders are not computers
weighing costs and benefits or risks and
rewards in objective fashion. They are
human beings endowed with their full
share of human weaknesses, including
especially vanity, pride and the felt
necessity of maintaining appearances,
whatever the reality.
Some Basics
1. The current territory of the Ukrainian
state was assembled, not by Ukrainians
themselves but by outsiders, and took its
present form following the end of World
War II. To think of it as a traditional or
primordial whole is absurd. This applies
a fortiori to the two most recent
additions to Ukraine—that of some
eastern portions of interwar Poland and
Czechoslovakia, annexed by Stalin at the
end of the war, and the largely Russian-
speaking Crimea, which was transferred
from the RSFSR well after the war, when
Nikita Khrushchev controlled the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Since all constituent parts of the USSR
were ruled from Moscow, it seemed at
the time a paper transfer of no practical
significance. (Even then, the city of
Sevastopol, the headquarters of the Black
Sea Fleet, was subordinated directly to
Moscow, not Kiev.) Up to then, the
Crimea had been considered an integral
part of Russia since Catherine “the
Great” conquered it in the 18th century.
2. The lumping together of people with
strikingly different historical experience
and comfortable in different (though
closely related) languages, underlies the
current divisions. That division,
however, is not clear-cut as it was, for
example, between the Czech lands and
Slovakia, which made a civilized divorce
practical. If one takes Galicia and
adjoining provinces in the west on the
one hand and the Donbas and Crimea in
the east and south on the other as
exemplars of the extremes, the areas in
between are mixed, proportions
gradually shifting from one tradition to
the other. There is no clear dividing line,
and Kyiv/Kiev would be claimed by both.
3. Because of its history, geographical
location, and both natural and
constructed economic ties, there is no
way Ukraine will ever be a prosperous,
healthy, or united country unless it has a
friendly (or, at the very least, non-
antagonistic) relationship with Russia.
4. Russia, as any other country would be,
is extremely sensitive about foreign
military activity adjacent to its borders.
It has signaled repeatedly that it will stop
at nothing to prevent NATO membership
for Ukraine. (In fact, most Ukrainians do
not want it.) Nevertheless, Ukrainian
membership in NATO was an avowed
objective of the Bush-Cheney
administration and one that has not
been categorically excluded by the
Obama Administration.
5. A wise Russian leadership (something
one can no more assume that one can a
wise U.S. or European leadership) could
tolerate a Ukraine that modernizes its
political and economic systems in
cooperation with the European Union so
long as (1) this is not seen as having an
anti-Russian basis; (2) Russian-speaking
citizens are granted social, cultural and
linquistic equality with Ukrainians, and
(3) most important of all, that the
gradual economic integration with
Europe will not lead to Ukraine
becoming a member of NATO.
6. So far, Ukrainian nationalists in the
west have been willing to concede none
of these conditions, and the United States
has, by its policies, either encouraged or
condoned attitudes and policies that
have made them anathema to Moscow.
This may be grossly unfair, but it is a
fact.
So where does this leave us? Some
random thoughts:
a. It has been a mistake for all the
parties, those in Ukraine and those
outside, to treat this crisis as a contest
for control of Ukraine.
b. Obama’s “warning” to Putin was ill-
advised. Whatever slim hope that
Moscow might avoid overt military
intervention in Ukraine disappeared
when Obama in effect threw down a
gauntlet and challenged him. This was
not just a mistake of political judgment—
it was a failure to understand human
psychology—unless, of course, he
actually wanted a Russian intervention,
which is hard for me to believe.
c. At this moment it is not clear, at least
to me, what the ultimate Russian intent
is. I do not believe it is in Russia’s
interest to split Ukraine, though they
may want to detach the Crimea from it—
and if they did, they would probably
have the support of the majority of
Crimean residents. But they may simply
wish to bolster the hand of their friends
in Eastern Ukraine in negotiations over
the new power structure. At the very
least, they are signaling that they will
not be deterred by the United States
from doing what they consider necessary
to secure their interests in the
neighborhood.
d. Ukraine is already shattered de facto,
with different groups in command of the
various provinces. If there is any hope
of putting it together again, there must
be cooperation of all parties in forming
a coalition at least minimally acceptable
to Russia and the Russian-speaking
Ukrainian citizens in the East and South.
A federation with governors elected
locally and not appointed by a winner-
take-all president or prime minister
would be essential. Real autonomy for
Crimea will also be required.
e. Many important questions remain.
One relates to the principle of
“territorial integrity.” Yes, that is
important, but it is not the only principle
to consider. Russians would argue, with
some substance in the argument, that the
U.S. is interested in territorial integrity
only when its interests are served.
American governments have a record of
ignoring it when convenient, as when it
and its NATO allies violated Serbian
territorial integrity by creating and then
recognizing an independent Kosovo.
Also, by supporting the separation of
South Sudan from Sudan, Eritrea from
Ethiopia, and East Timor from
Indonesia.
So far as violating sovereignty is
concerned, Russia would point out that
the U.S. invaded Panama to arrest
Noriega, invaded Grenada to prevent
American citizens from being taken
hostage (even though they had not been
taken hostage), invaded Iraq on spurious
grounds that Saddam Hussein possessed
weapons of mass destruction, targets
people in other countries with drones,
etc., etc. In other words, for the U.S. to
preach about respect for sovereignty and
preservation of territorial integrity to a
Russian president can seem a claim to
special rights not allowed others.
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Internal Division